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UNJUST ENRICHMENT AS THE PREIARY BASIS FOR RAISING
A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
In Pope v. Garrett two of the several heirs of one Carrie Green,
the deceased owner of certain realty, had forcibly prevented the
execution of her will. As a result the realty went to the eight heirs
at lav instead of to the sole devisee. The court imposed a construc-
tive trust in favor of the sole devisee7 on the heirs who participated
in the illegal and fraudulent acts. However, the court refused to hold
the non-participating heirs as constructive trustees for the reason
that they had not been guilty of such misconduct, fraud, or illegal
acts as to warrant the raising of a constructive trust.
The court's view, that one who acquired title to land through
his own fraud will be declared a constructive trustee of the prop-
erty so acquired, is well supported. It is probably true that the
decision as to the non-participating heirs is the general rule, but due
to the paucity of cases with similar fact situations, this problem is
not necessarily well settled. Dye v. Parkere is one of the few cases
which presents a relation of facts to law comparable to that of the
principal case. Here the draftsman who had been directed by the
testator to insert a legacy for the plaintiff fraudulently left it out.
The court refused to make the heir, wife of the draftsman, in whom
the property vested, a constructive trustee on the basis of the fact
that she was ignorant of the fraud.
Although not discussed by the court in this case,. it seems that it
would be possible, as an alternative remedy, for the devisee to bring
an action in tort against the draftsman for destroying his expect-
ancy. The devisee in the principal case might have recovered in
tort against the participating heirs damages based on the value of
property that would have passed by will except for the wrongful
act.4 However, the relief in such a case might still be financially
inadequate so this is substantial reason to consider whether a cou2t
in its equitable powers could impose a constructive trust.
Although it appears to be the general rule that in order to raise
a constructive trust there must exist fraud or some illegal act on the
part of the person who receives the benefit, this is not necessarily
the better view It is the purpose of this note to suggest as a better
view that unjust enrichment alone is enough to impress a construc-
tive trust on the person accidentally benefited as a result of the
'- Texas-, 204 S.W 2d 867 (1947).
Wrlla v. Wrlla, 342 11. 31, 173 N.E. 768 (1930), Tate v.,Emery,
139 Ore. 214, 9 P 2d 136 (1932)
108 Kan. 304, 194 Pac. 640, rehearing denied, 195 Pac. 599
(1921).
' Pope v. Garrett, - Texas----, 204 S.W 2d 867, 871 (1947).
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fraud of a third person. It seems only just that property should vest
as the testator intended, in preference to vesting in one who received
it by chance and who in reality has no right to it where the pro-
posed! settlor has-done all hefarrly could, do to -arry out his purpose.
This theory has received the supportof some of the foremost author-
ities. For instance, Scott says in a discussion of the problem:
"Thus if A is induced by the fraud ,of B to, make
a legacy to C, C should not be permitted to'keep the
legacy* 9lthough 'he was not a party to, the fraud. The
same is true 'where by the wrongful act of a third per-
son a testator is ..induced to revoke his will or is pre-
vented from revoking his will or is prevented from
making a will."5"
It seems the fact ,situation of Pope v, Garret.t should fall under the
last one of these general categories although in-that case the testator
was merely prevented from executing her ,will and not from making
it. The intention of the testator is, of course, plainer when the will
itself is in existence.
Another well-known authority in discussing the companon case
of Dye v. Parker says, " there seems, to .be no adequate reason
,why a .trust should not be raised to prevent the heir or legatee from
being unjustly enriched. "' It is true the principal. case makes
the statement, not only that there ,must be fraud .or an illegal. act,
,but that there is no unjust enrichment under.these facts. The reason-
ing is this: "The fact that the wrongful act caused, the non-partici-
pating appellants to become ves.ted with undivided interest in the
land resulted from the laws of descent and distribution.. And what
the law gives a party can never be called unjust enrichment. 7
This apparently plausible statement does not seem to reach a desir-
able result. It is certainly possible to arrive at the opposite conclu-
sion. Unjust enrichment has been defined as "Acquisition of prop-
erty under such circumstances that one is legally or equitably bound
to make a return of it "' It is not conclusive that when the law
incidentally gives a benefit to a party that he is also equitably en-
titled to keep it. In direct conflict with the case it.has been stated:
"There is no doubt -that a person who acquires
property through his own wrong, or even through the
wrong of a third person, is unjustly enriched if he is
permitted to keep the property If there is' never any
question as to the facts, there is no doubt that a con-
structive trust should be imposed."'
-3 SCOTT, TRUSTS (1939) sec. 489.5.
'Evans, Torts to Expectancies 'in Decedents' Estates (1944) 93
U. OF PA. L. REv. 187, 192.
Pope v. Garrett, - Texas- , 204 S.W 2d 867, '871 (1947).
8 WEBSTfR, NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY' OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1944) 2783.
9 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS (1939) sec. 489.6.
STUDENT NOTES AND C031[ ENTS
It has often been held that no one can claim an interest resulting
from a fraud committed by-another person.'"
Because cases with similar fact situations are so rare, analogies
are presented in order to give strength to the view that unjust en-
richment alonn should -be enough to allow the non-participating
heirs in the principal case to be declared trustees. Scott suggests
this example:
"Where property is devised to two persons as ten-
ants in common and one of them prormses to hold the
property in trust for a third person, a constructive
trust is enforceable only against the person making the
promise; yet where a person by actual fraud procures
a devise to others, neither he nor the others Will be
permitted to retain the property.""
It is important to note the similarity here to the facts in Pope v.
Garrett. In each case we have property benefiting an innocent per-
son as a result of the fraud of a third person-yet, in the example a
constructive trust is imposed on the innocent person.
There is another analogy which supports the theory proposed,
in which the owner of property is induced by the fraud of a third
person to transfer. property to the grantee. The transfer can be set
aside as long as. the holder is, not a bona fide purchaser.'2 It is
thought that the situation is similar to oe where the person who
obtained the property through fraud had made a gift to another. If.
so the gratuitous transfer would not prevent raising a constructive
trust upon property when it was in the hands of one who would
lose nothing to which he would otherwise have been entitled."
Here again, the innocent grantee's situation parallels that of the in-
nocent devisee, since each receives a benefit as the result of the
fraud of a third person.
In a third example,. although fraud does not exist there is un-
just enrichment and an innocent grantee. For instance: When -the
owner of property, transfers a greater interest in property than he
intended, even though the transferee sells the property, the grantor
is held to be entitled to the proceeds of the sale." Where the owner
of property intending to transfer it 'to one person, by mistake of
fact" or law'" transfers it to another, there is no doubt that the
grantee cannot keep the property if he is not ih the position of a
0 O'Connor v. O'Connor, 291 Pa. 175, 139 Atl. 734 (1927), Stirk's
Estate, 232 Pa. 98, 110, 81 AtI. 187, 192 (1911)
"3 SCOTT, TRUSTS (1939) sec. 489.5.
12-See Ruhe v Ruhe, 113 Md. 595, 77 Atl. 797, 800 (1910) 3
SCOTT, TRUSTS (1939) sec. 469.
"3 SCOTT, TRUSTS (1939) sec. 469.
Andrews v. Andrews, 12 Ind. 348 (1859)
"In re Berry, 147 Fed. 208 (C.C.A. 2d, 1906).
SKnght Newspapers v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
143 Fed. 2d, 1007, 1011 (C.C.A. 6th, 1944).
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bona fide purchaser.'" "The grantee having acquired the property
by a mistake holds it upon a constructive trust."'"
Although the court in the principal case requires actual fraud
on the part of a constructive trustee-some courts require for the
creation of a constructive trust either actual or only what they term
consructive fraud.'9 The term constructive fraud is deceptive. It has
been stated that " constructive fraud has been evolved to desig-
nate, what is, in its essence, nothing more than the receipt and re-
tention of Unmerited benefits."'  This definition of constructive
fraud seems actually to define unust, enrichment. The theory sub-
mitted that unjust enrichment is enoughto raise a constructive trust
does not seem too radical in view of the fact that the term construc-
tive fraud, which has been used to declare constructive trusts, is a
mere fiction which is sometimes based on the receipt and retention
of unmerited benefits or in other words unjust enrichment."1 It ap-
pears that the courts by using the fiction of constructive fraud have
tried to disguise the fact that they have in reality created construc-
tive trusts based on unjust enrichment. It would seem far more
logical where the fact situations create unjust enrichment to use
that term instead of the ambiguous one of constructive fraud. In
conclusion it seems that in the case of Pope v. Garrett not only a
better but a far more feasible result would have been reached if
the "receipt and retention" of the property by the non-participating
heirs had been held to be such an "unjust enrichment" as to require
the raising of a constructive trust.
WANDA L. SPEARS
173 SCOTT, TRUSTS (1939) sec. 467.
"
8 See 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) sec. 474.
"Kester v Amon, 81 Mont. 1, 261 Pac. 288 (1927) See Mark-
worth v State Say Bank of Woden, 212 Iowa 754, 237 N.W 471, 474
(1931)
'See Hering v Harris, 117 N.J. Eq. 146, 175 Atl. 169, 172 (1934)
(citing 2 LAWRENCE, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 724)
-'In cases where the testator intending to devise land to A is
induced by B to devise it to B on the promise (express or implied)
of B that A should either use it jointly with B or that B would de-
vise it to A on B's death, courts have impressed a constructive
trust on B in favor of A on the basis of constructive fraud. The
term constructive fraud in this situation, in reality consists only of
the unjust enrichment of B. The promise of B is not conclusively
fraudulent since he may have meant to carry it out at the time of
the testator's death and for some reason later have changed his
plan. Rudd v. Gates, 191 Ky 456, 230 S.W 906 (1921), Taylor v.
Fox's Ex'rs, 162 Ky. 804, 173 S.W 154 (1915), Chapman's Ex'r v
Chapman, 152 Ky 344, 153 S.W 434 (1913).
